Mazur: Why the law must face the reality of how legal work gets done

Bar grad Abbas Hussain explains the practical implications of the landmark judgment

The Court of Appeal’s decision in CILEX & Ors v Mazur & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 3691 marks a pivotal moment in the interpretation of the Legal Services Act 2007 (LSA 2007), particularly in relation to the conduct of litigation and the role of unauthorised legal professionals. By overturning the restrictive approach adopted at first instance, the court restored a long standing understanding of legal practice rooted in supervision, delegation, and professional responsibility. While widely described as a “return to normality,” the decision is better understood as a careful recalibration of legal regulation in a modern, resource constrained justice system.

The judgment is not merely of doctrinal significance. It has immediate and practical implications for the operation of courts, the management of litigation and the ability for public bodies and legal services providers to deliver effective representation in an increasingly strained system.

Who conducts litigation?

The key issue before the Court of Appeal was whether an unauthorised person could lawfully carry out tasks that fall within the scope of the “conduct of litigation” where those tasks are undertaken under the supervision of an authorised individual. The High Court had taken a narrow view, suggesting that such tasks could not be performed by unauthorised persons if they amounted to the conduct of litigation, even where supervision was present.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation. It held that the proper focus is not on the identity of the individual performing each task, but on who retains overall responsibility for the litigation. In a passage that is now central to the legal position,

Lord Justice Birss stated at paragraph 187(3) that an unauthorised person may lawfully perform tasks within the scope of litigation provided that an authorised individual retains both formal responsibility and the responsibilities identified under section 1(3) of the LSA 2007. In such circumstances, it is the authorised individual who is properly regarded as conducting the litigation. This approach restores a functional and realistic understanding of legal practice and one that reflects how litigation has historically been conducted.

Delegation as a structural feature of legal practice

A strength of the judgment lies in its recognition that delegation is not an anomaly but a structural feature of legal services. The Court of Appeal acknowledged that solicitors have long relied on assistants, clerks, and other non-authorised individuals to carry out substantial aspects of litigation work. The modern legal workplace, particularly in high volume or publicly funded environments, depends upon this division of labour.

The court emphasised that what matters is not whether tasks are delegated, but whether the authorised person retains direction and control. Supervision, the court made clear, is not a fixed or rigid concept. Its intensity will vary depending on the nature of the task, the experience of the individual performing it, and the context in which it arises. This flexible understanding is essential if the law is to remain aligned with practical reality.

By contrast, the High Court’s approach risked imposing an artificial and unworkable distinction between assisting with litigation and conducting it. Such a distinction fails to reflect the collaborative nature of modern legal work and would have imposed significant operational burdens on legal services.

The Legal Services Act 2007 and its proper interpretation

The Court of Appeal’s reasoning is firmly grounded in a purposive interpretation of the LSA 2007. Rather than treating the Act as a strict barrier to participation in legal work, the Court examined its underlying objectives, which include improving access to justice, protecting consumers, and maintaining professional standards.

The restrictive interpretation adopted at first instance risked undermining these objectives by reducing the pool of individuals able to carry out litigation tasks and by increasing the cost and complexity of delivering legal services. The Court of Appeal recognised that the Act was not intended to dismantle longstanding and legitimate practices of delegation, but rather to ensure that such practices operate within a framework of accountability.

The judgment also clarifies the role of Schedule 3 to the Act, which preserves the ability of unauthorised individuals to undertake certain activities where they fall within recognised exemptions. This reinforces the idea that authorisation is not the sole mechanism through which legal work may be lawfully performed.

Implications for the administration of justice

One of the most significant, though often understated, consequences of the Court of Appeal’s decision lies in its impact on the administration of justice. The modern court system is under considerable strain, with persistent delays, significant case backlogs, and increasing pressure on judicial resources. Against this backdrop, the ability for legal services to operate efficiently is not merely a professional concern but a systemic necessity.

Had the High Court’s restrictive interpretation been upheld, the practical consequences would have been profound. Legal teams, particularly within local authorities, law centres and high volume litigation practices, would have been forced to restructure their operations to ensure that only authorised individuals carried out litigation tasks. This would likely have resulted in fewer cases being progressed efficiently, increased costs, and greater delays in bringing matters before the court.

By reaffirming the lawfulness of supervised delegation, the Court of Appeal has enabled legal teams to continue operating in a manner that supports the timely progression of cases. Non authorised professionals, including litigation officers and paralegals, play a crucial role in managing caseloads, preparing documents, and attending routine hearings. Their contribution allows authorised lawyers to focus on more complex matters, thereby improving overall efficiency.

In this way, the judgment indirectly supports the courts themselves. By preserving a flexible and functional model of legal service delivery, it helps to reduce bottlenecks, facilitate case progression, and mitigate the effects of systemic delay. The decision therefore aligns not only with legal principle but with the practical needs of a justice system under pressure.

Critical reflections and ongoing tensions

Despite its strengths, the judgment leaves certain questions unresolved. The Court’s deliberately flexible approach to supervision, while pragmatic, introduces a degree of uncertainty. It remains unclear precisely where the boundary lies between acceptable delegation and an impermissible abdication of responsibility. This lack of precision may lead to cautious or inconsistent interpretations by regulators and employers. Furthermore, the case highlights broader issues of regulatory fragmentation.

Divergences between the approaches of different regulatory bodies, including the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) and CILEX, contributed to the uncertainty that gave rise to the litigation. While the Court of Appeal has clarified the legal position, it has not resolved the underlying tensions within the regulatory framework. Nevertheless, these concerns do not detract from the core achievement of the judgment, which is to restore a coherent and workable understanding of the law.

Conclusion

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Mazur represents a significant and necessary correction to an overly restrictive interpretation of the LSA 2007. By reaffirming that litigation may be conducted through structured delegation under the supervision of an authorised individual, the Court has aligned legal doctrine with longstanding professional practice.

More importantly, the judgment recognises the realities of modern legal service delivery and the pressures facing the justice system. In doing so, it not only restores legal orthodoxy but also supports the efficient functioning of courts by enabling legal teams to operate flexibly and effectively.

Mazur is therefore not simply a return to normality. It is a reaffirmation of a fundamental principle, that the law must accommodate the practical realities of legal work while preserving accountability and professional responsibility. In an era of increasing demand and limited resources, that balance is more important than ever.

Abbas was called to the bar in October 2025, with experience in local government and civil litigation. Prior to call, he has worked as a principal lawyer, and lawyer across multiple local authorities, advising on and conducting matters including commercial disputes, contractual litigation, public law, housing and regulatory enforcement, and regularly appearing in the County Court and Magistrates’ Court. He has a particular interest in civil, public and commercial law, including inquests and inquiries, and writes on issues relating to legal practice, public decision making and access to justice.